3dsmax MCP Server
3dsmax-mcp
PyPI
v1.5.1
Published by cl0nazepamm — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for AI agents to control Autodesk 3ds Max
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([inspect_object, get_object_properties]) and tools that can send data out ([create_shell_material]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [inspect_object, get_object_properties] → sinks [create_shell_material]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow inspect_object → create_shell_material
high Tool "create_shell_material" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "create_shell_material" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool create_shell_material
high Shell/command execution in server code (install.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`install.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l /F "{path}"' subprocess.run( ["powershell", "-Command", f'Start-Process -FilePath
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server install.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (uninstall.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`uninstall.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l /F "{path}"' subprocess.run( ["powershell", "-Command", f'Start-Process -FilePath
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server uninstall.py
low Mutating tool "create_shell_material" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_shell_material" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_shell_material
Tools 141
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_shell_materialruns code / shellget_object_propertiesreads sensitive datainspect_objectreads sensitive dataadd_controller_targetno sensitive capabilityadd_data_channelno sensitive capabilityadd_dc_script_operatorno sensitive capabilityadd_modifierno sensitive capabilityadd_tyflow_collisionno sensitive capabilityadd_tyflow_eventno sensitive capabilityanalyze_node_orientationno sensitive capability
Show 131 more tools ↓
assign_controllerno sensitive capabilityassign_materialno sensitive capabilitybackup_material_libraryno sensitive capabilitybatch_file_infono sensitive capabilitybatch_rename_objectsno sensitive capabilitybatch_replace_materialsno sensitive capabilityboolean_operationno sensitive capabilitybuild_floor_planno sensitive capabilitycapture_multi_viewno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenno sensitive capabilitycapture_tyflow_editorno sensitive capabilitycapture_viewportno sensitive capabilitychat_clearno sensitive capabilitychat_reloadno sensitive capabilitychat_statusno sensitive capabilityclone_objectsno sensitive capabilitycollapse_modifier_stackno sensitive capabilityconnect_tyflow_eventsno sensitive capabilityconnect_tyflow_operatorno sensitive capabilitycreate_material_from_texturesno sensitive capabilitycreate_objectno sensitive capabilitycreate_texture_mapno sensitive capabilitycreate_tyflowno sensitive capabilitycreate_tyflow_presetno sensitive capabilitydelete_effectno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectsno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_tyflow_operatorno sensitive capabilitydiscover_plugin_classesno sensitive capabilitydiscover_plugin_surfaceno sensitive capabilitydraw_splineno sensitive capabilityedit_verticesno sensitive capabilityexecute_maxscriptno sensitive capabilityget_bridge_statusno sensitive capabilityget_camera_sequenceno sensitive capabilityget_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityget_effectsno sensitive capabilityget_hierarchyno sensitive capabilityget_instancesno sensitive capabilityget_material_libraryno sensitive capabilityget_material_slotsno sensitive capabilityget_materialsno sensitive capabilityget_plugin_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityget_plugin_manifestno sensitive capabilityget_railclone_style_graphno sensitive capabilityget_session_contextno sensitive capabilityget_state_setsno sensitive capabilityget_tyflow_graphno sensitive capabilityget_tyflow_infono sensitive capabilityget_tyflow_particle_countno sensitive capabilityget_tyflow_particlesno sensitive capabilityget_wired_paramsno sensitive capabilityharvest_tyflow_manifestno sensitive capabilityinspect_controllerno sensitive capabilityinspect_data_channelno sensitive capabilityinspect_material_networkno sensitive capabilityinspect_max_fileno sensitive capabilityinspect_modifier_propertiesno sensitive capabilityinspect_plugin_classno sensitive capabilityinspect_plugin_constructorno sensitive capabilityinspect_plugin_instanceno sensitive capabilityinspect_propertiesno sensitive capabilityinspect_track_viewno sensitive capabilityintrospect_classno sensitive capabilityintrospect_instanceno sensitive capabilityintrospect_oslno sensitive capabilityinvoke_toolno sensitive capabilityisolate_and_capture_selectedno sensitive capabilitykeyframe_tracksno sensitive capabilitylearn_scene_patternsno sensitive capabilitylist_dc_operatorsno sensitive capabilitylist_dc_presetsno sensitive capabilitylist_plugin_classesno sensitive capabilitylist_tyflow_operator_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_tyflow_operatorsno sensitive capabilitylist_wireable_paramsno sensitive capabilityload_dc_presetno sensitive capabilitymain_threadno sensitive capabilitymake_modifier_uniqueno sensitive capabilitymanage_data_channel_stackno sensitive capabilitymanage_groupsno sensitive capabilitymanage_layersno sensitive capabilitymanage_sceneno sensitive capabilitymanage_selection_setsno sensitive capabilitymap_class_relationshipsno sensitive capabilitymcg_get_contextno sensitive capabilitymcg_inspect_graphno sensitive capabilitymcg_list_graphsno sensitive capabilitymcg_search_operatorsno sensitive capabilitymerge_from_fileno sensitive capabilitymodify_tyflow_operatorno sensitive capabilitymy_toolno sensitive capabilitypalette_laydownno sensitive capabilityquery_sceneno sensitive capabilityrefresh_plugin_manifestno sensitive capabilityremove_modifierno sensitive capabilityremove_tyflow_elementno sensitive capabilityrender_automationsno sensitive capabilityrender_sceneno sensitive capabilityreplace_materialno sensitive capabilityreplicate_materialno sensitive capabilityreset_tyflow_simulationno sensitive capabilityrun_tool_smokeno sensitive capabilityscatter_forest_packno sensitive capabilitysearch_max_filesno sensitive capabilityselect_objectsno sensitive capabilitysend_to_chatno sensitive capabilityset_controller_propsno sensitive capabilityset_data_channel_operatorno sensitive capabilityset_material_propertiesno sensitive capabilityset_material_propertyno sensitive capabilityset_modifier_propertyno sensitive capabilityset_modifier_stateno sensitive capabilityset_object_propertyno sensitive capabilityset_parentno sensitive capabilityset_sub_materialno sensitive capabilityset_texture_map_propertiesno sensitive capabilityset_tyflow_physxno sensitive capabilityset_tyflow_shapeno sensitive capabilityset_tyflow_wiring_ledgerno sensitive capabilityset_visibilityno sensitive capabilitysmart_importno sensitive capabilitytoggle_effectno sensitive capabilitytransform_objectno sensitive capabilitytyflow_apply_patchno sensitive capabilitytyflow_event_censusno sensitive capabilityundo_lastno sensitive capabilityunwire_paramsno sensitive capabilitywalk_referencesno sensitive capabilitywatch_sceneno sensitive capabilitywire_paramsno sensitive capabilitywrite_osl_shaderno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (141 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan 3dsmax-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.