365center MCP Server
365center-mcp
npm
v1.4.0
Published by crscristi28 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Microsoft 365 / Office 365 SharePoint — full read-write access to sites, documents, pages, metadata, navigation, and permissions
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:92`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenantId}/oauth2/v2.0/token`, { method: "POST", heade
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_documentingests untrusted inputget_page_canvas_contentingests untrusted inputget_page_canvas_summaryingests untrusted inputlist_pagesingests untrusted inputpatch_page_canvas_webpartingests untrusted inputset_page_canvas_contentingests untrusted inputadd_navigation_linkno sensitive capabilityadd_quick_linksno sensitive capabilityadd_user_to_groupno sensitive capabilitycopy_pageno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
create_choice_columnno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_pageno sensitive capabilitycreate_page_with_contentno sensitive capabilitycreate_siteno sensitive capabilitycreate_text_columnno sensitive capabilitydelete_columnno sensitive capabilitydelete_documentno sensitive capabilitydelete_navigation_linkno sensitive capabilitydelete_pageno sensitive capabilityget_document_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_document_versionsno sensitive capabilityget_group_membersno sensitive capabilityget_navigationno sensitive capabilityget_permissionsno sensitive capabilityget_siteno sensitive capabilityget_site_by_idno sensitive capabilitylist_columnsno sensitive capabilitylist_document_librariesno sensitive capabilitylist_documentsno sensitive capabilitylist_sitesno sensitive capabilitypublish_pageno sensitive capabilityremove_user_from_groupno sensitive capabilitysearch_documentsno sensitive capabilityset_document_metadatano sensitive capabilityupload_documentno sensitive capabilityupload_documentsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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