0nmcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "0nmcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "0nmcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "0nmcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (200 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: dispatch_ecosystem → crm_media_list → crm_form_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "dispatch_ecosystem → crm_media_list → crm_form_upload_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"dr_account_get",
"dr_get_grade",
"dispatch_rules",
"dispatch_ecosystem",
"factory_get",
"pwd_get",
"rc_form_get",
"rc_sequence_get",
"rc_page_get",
"shadcn_get_component",
"shadcn_registry_browse",
"shadcn_registry_get"
],
"sources": [
"crm_media_list"
],
"sinks": [
"crm_report_billing",
"crm_send_email",
"crm_form_upload_file",
"dr_export_to_sheet",
"factory_spawn"
],
"path": [
"dispatch_ecosystem",
"crm_media_list",
"crm_form_upload_file"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "dispatch_ecosystem",
"to": "crm_media_list",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "crm_media_list",
"to": "crm_form_upload_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"factory_spawn\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"factory_spawn\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "factory_spawn"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (auth.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`auth.js:164`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "auth.js"
},
"evidence": "exec } = await import(\"child_process\"); const url = `${verification_uri}?code=${user_code}`; const cmd = proces",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "auth.js",
"line": 164,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cli.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cli.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import fs from 'fs",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "cli.js",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (engine/local-ai.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/local-ai.js:390`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/local-ai.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions\", { method: \"POST\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "engine/local-ai.js",
"line": 390,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (engine/sxo-writer.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/sxo-writer.js:268`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/sxo-writer.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST', headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "engine/sxo-writer.js",
"line": 268,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (landing_pages/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`landing_pages/index.js:191`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "landing_pages/index.js"
},
"evidence": "); const res = await fetch(`https://api.vercel.com/v13/deployments${teamQuery}`, { method: 'POST', headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "landing_pages/index.js",
"line": 191,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (lib/knowledge-layers.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/knowledge-layers.js:411`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/knowledge-layers.js"
},
"evidence": "anthropic: () => fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'x-api-key':",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "lib/knowledge-layers.js",
"line": 411,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (rocket_convert.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`rocket_convert.js:712`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "rocket_convert.js"
},
"evidence": "const r = await fetch(\"https://services.leadconnectorhq.com/contacts/\", { method: \"POST\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "rocket_convert.js",
"line": 712,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (shadcn.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`shadcn.js:453`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "shadcn.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://ui.shadcn.com/r/styles/new-york/index.json\"); const json = await res.json",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "shadcn.js",
"line": 453,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"factory_spawn\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"factory_spawn\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "factory_spawn"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (install.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`install.js:114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "install.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); execSync(\"which claude 2>/dev/null || where claude 2>nul\", { stdio: \"pipe\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "install.js",
"line": 114,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"dr_account_get",
"dr_get_grade",
"dispatch_rules",
"dispatch_ecosystem",
"factory_get",
"pwd_get",
"rc_form_get",
"rc_sequence_get",
"rc_page_get",
"shadcn_get_component",
"shadcn_registry_browse",
"shadcn_registry_get"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"crm_media_list"
],
"externalSink": [
"crm_report_billing",
"crm_send_email",
"crm_form_upload_file",
"dr_export_to_sheet",
"factory_spawn"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"dispatch_ecosystem",
"crm_media_list",
"crm_form_upload_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: dispatch_ecosystem → crm_media_list → crm_form_upload_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "patent_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "patent_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "patent_watchlist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "patent_alerts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brand_defender",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_indexing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sitemap_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "knowledge_base",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "content_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "service_catalog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vendor_registry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reddit_engine_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_auth_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_exchange_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_refresh_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_create_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_create_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_create_custom_values",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_process_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_deploy_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_list_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_list_pipelines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_build_ai_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_list_ai_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_run_ai_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_report_billing",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crm_create_payment_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_generate_course",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_list_courses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_list_email_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_create_email_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_list_email_campaigns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crm_generate_warmup_schedule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_get_template_preview_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_marketplace_charge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_marketplace_get_charges",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_marketplace_has_funds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_marketplace_installer_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_marketplace_rebilling_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_marketplace_delete_charge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_marketplace_uninstall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_media_list",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crm_media_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_media_create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_media_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_media_rename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_media_bulk_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_oauth_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_oauth_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_oauth_resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_saas_generate_payment_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_saas_get_company_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_saas_update_location_rebilling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_sdk_survey_submissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_sdk_form_submissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_form_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crm_decrypt_user_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_account_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_account_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dr_account_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_account_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_track",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_grade",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_get_grade",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dr_get_rollup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_export_to_sheet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"export_to\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dr_send_google_ads_conversion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_send_meta_conversion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_send_linkedin_conversion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_send_tiktok_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_send_x_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dr_fanout_grade",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_pull",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_rules",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_ecosystem",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
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